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Abstract 
This thesis will analyze the Confucius Institute at Suez Canal University in Egypt. Since 
2004 China has been establishing Confucius Institute around the World. The official task 
of these institutes is to teach Chinese language and culture to foreign publics. However, 
there are many different opinions about these institutes, and thus superiority of a 
certain position is absent. Some of the previous literature perceive Confucius Institute as 
Soft Power instrument while some other argue that the institutes simply aim to teach 
Chinese language and culture. This thesis, which is an interview study, asks about the 
power mechanism operating in Confucius Institute at Suez Canal University in Egypt. Its 
aim is to find out whether Chinese political and economic interests work at this institute. 
Also, since most of the previous literature lack empirical backgrounds in their studies 
which make them more abstract, this study by analyzing the Confucius Institute at Suez 
Canal University adds its result to previous findings as an attempt to make the picture 
about the nature of Confucius Institutes clearer.  
 
Keywords: Confucius Institute, Public Diplomacy, Critical realism, Political and Economic 
Interests, China, Egypt  
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Abbreviation 
 
CASTTC China Arab State Technology Transfer Center 
CCs  Confucius Classrooms 
CCP  Chinese Communist Party 
CHEC  China Harbor Engineering Company 
CI  Confucius Institute 
CIs  Confucius Institutes 
CIM  Confucius Institute Magazine 
COSCO Chinese Ocean Shipping Company 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FOCAC Forum On China Africa Cooperation 
HRD  Human Resource Development 
HSK  Chinese Proficiency Test (The Hànyǔ Shuǐpíng Kǎoshì) 
RQ  Research Question 
SCU  Suez Canal University 
SOE  State Owned Enterprise 
SOC  State Owned Company 
SQs  Sub Questions 
TEDA  Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area 
TOEFL Test Of English as a Foreign Language 
USD  United States Dollars 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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1. Introduction  
The idea of establishing Confucius Institutes (CIs) goes back to 2002 when Chinese 
authorities began to think about setting up an institute which advocates teaching Chinese 
language and culture in foreign countries (Li 2008; Hartig 2012; Flew and Hartig 2014). In 
2004, the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), officially announced 
the establishment of the first CI in South Korea.  
 
Indeed, the advocacy of Chinese language and culture, which are the formal reasons behind 
the establishment of CI, occurred in tandem with China’s global rise. The roots causes of this 
rise or re-emergence of China can be traced back to 1980’s when then Chinese governments 
had successfully implemented different trade liberalization policies and political reforms, 
which have worked as the springboard for the development of China’s economy.  
 
These policy changes and reforms have resulted in China’s rapid economic growth. Chinese 
GDP now makes up more than 10% of World GDP (World Bank 2016). In the same context, 
at the World Economic Forum which has taken place in 2017 at Davos in Switzerland, the 
Chinese president, Xi Jinping has announced his willingness to contribute more to the world 
by taking the current role of the USA as a leading player in free trade and globalization (Xi 
2017).  
 
Parallel to its economic growth, China’s expenditure on the military sector has increased too. 
By the end of the Cold War, China began to spend more on the defense and security sectors. 
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, in reality, China is spending almost twice of 
what it officially reports. These official reports show military and security spending has 
increased from 10 billion USD in the 1990’s to 114 billion USD in 2012. The report estimates 
that China’s actual expenditure is about 216 billion USD. Also, China has been able to 
modernize its security defense, and it invests in advanced missiles and cyberspace capacities 
(United States Department of Defense 2013). Consequently, the amalgamation of rapid 
economic growth and military development in the view of some scholars have intensified 
international concerns about China’s rise and the prospect of seeing it as a possible threat 
(Bernstein and Munro 1997; Tkacik 2006:2010; Cole 2010).  
 
In addition to economic and military power, China has realized its need for the additional type 
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of power, namely ‘Soft power’.1 The critical juncture in Chinese efforts to accomplish soft 
power was in 2007 when then Chinese President Hu Jintao related the idea of rejuvenation of 
China to the ability of the country to deploy soft power. This approach reflects the Chinese 
perception of its position in the world and how it is moving from being a regional power to be 
a global power. The Chinese authorities have realized that being a super power would entail 
new methods when traditional political and economic means are not sufficient (Shambaugh 
2016; Economy 2016; Nye 2016). Subsequently, Chinese authorities have developed a 
strategy for their soft power and have determined what it constitutes. These various elements 
of Chinese soft power include ‘Confucianism’ and the ‘One Belt One Road’ policy (Economy 
2016).2  
 
Given the fact that sometimes the line between China’s public diplomacy and its soft power is 
blurred the two terms have been used interchangeably. In fact, some scholars argue that China 
lacks true soft power because the authorities construct its alleged soft power and it is not 
organic (Economy 2016; Shambaugh 2016). Nevertheless, it has been argued that public 
diplomacy is a precondition and an instrument for inducing soft power (Hartig 2016:49). 
Since China has realized the need for achieving soft power, its general diplomacy has 
intensified too. In 2012, Hu Jintao stressed the need for public diplomacy and cultural 
exchanges (Hu J. 2012), and two years later Xi Jinping (2014) has asserted that although 
many people greet China’s performance, some others are afraid of this issue. Therefore, he 
has stated the importance of public diplomacy for China’s economic growth and its rapid 
development (Xi J. 2014). (Xinhua 2014).  
 
One part of China’s public diplomacy concerns working with its language and culture. The 
previous Chinese presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have expressed this matter by 
notifying the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in their respective reports in 2002 and 2007. 
They have highlighted the importance of language and culture in serving China’s national 
                                                      
1 Joseph Nye raised the term of Soft power, and it means, the ability of an actor to receive what it 
craves by attraction and through setting the agenda and shaping the preferences of the others (Nye 
2004:5). The idea of China’s soft power will be discussed more in the section on China’s foreign 
policy. 
2 This policy is China’s new slogan, and it was presented by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. 
This strategy is about establishing a Maritime Silk Road and reviving the ancient Silk Road which 
connects China to the Europe. Additionally, it resembles China’s attempt to widen its global economic 
activities in a multipolar world (The State Council of China 2015). 
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interests and enhancing its capacity to play a major role in the world (Jiang 2002; Hu 2007).  
Subsequently, China has set up CI which officially is concerned with teaching Chinese 
language and culture. However, previous literature disagrees upon nature of CI and the role 
they play in China’s foreign policy. One reason is that information about CIs are vague, as 
CIs lack a solo model and detailed rules and regulations for what and how they should act. As 
stated by Liu Yandong, then Vice Premier, the CIs should be diverse, take different roles and 
adapt themselves to local circumstances (Yandong 2009 cited in Vermaak, 2010:8).  
 
Furthermore, CIs are some of China’s most ambivalent Institute, since it is unclear what 
project of CI implies and what it implements on the ground. On the one hand, CIs have been 
criticized for being a tool of China’s foreign policy for exercising soft power (Larsson 2008). 
On the other hand, CIs has been perceived as educational institutes, which are only concerned 
with teaching China’s language and culture. This position adds that CIs cannot be soft power 
tools because they are demand driven and thus the risk of being part of a propaganda project 
is too low (Hartig 2016).  
 
Today, there are approximately 500 CIs, and 1000 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) in the world, 
of them 46 CIs and 23 CCs are in Africa. Since 2008, Hanban has established two CIs in 
Egypt, one at Cairo University and another one at Suez Canal University (SCU). The increase 
in the number of CIs in Africa comes at a time where China improves its public diplomacy 
with Africa through different projects, like ‘Social Development Cooperation’ where one part 
of it is about establishing of CI (FOCAC 2015).  
 
1.1 Aim and Research Question  
Because of disagreement about the nature of CIs, the results of previous literature cannot be 
generalized. This thesis aims to study one of these non-studied CIs and which is at SCU in 
Egypt. So far, there has been a few studies done on CIs, and our knowledge about this 
Institute is inadequate. Also, based on previous literature, the disagreement on nature of this 
Institute becomes evident. Furthermore, some other preliminary evidence and facts,  
like the strategic position of Suez Canal, make one suspicious about real nature of this 
Institute. Therefore, because a large part of previous literature takes a critical position toward 
CIs and because of China’s overall political and economic engagement in Africa, this thesis 
adopts a questionable position toward CI at SCU and identifies CI as a potential actor in 
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China’s public diplomacy. In addition, China’s ‘One Road One Belt Policy’ which includes 
Egypt and specifically Suez region to the plan strengthen this idea. Furthermore, primary 
considerations make this thesis assume that CI at SCU is more than an institute which only 
teaches Chinese language and culture, even though cultural and language activities benefit 
China’s national interests. The thesis assumes that in addition to cultural and language 
activities, CI accomplishes other activities.  
 
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to find out whether there are hidden mechanisms, namely 
political and economic interests operating at CI in SCU in Egypt. Consequently, this thesis 
makes two assumptions about role and nature of this CI and which can be substantiated by 
finding evidence. The assumptions are: 1) CI at SCU serves China’s political interests, and 2) 
CI at SCU supports China’s economic development. In this thesis, I seek to find evidence, 
which can either substantiate or discredit the assumptions. A research question (RQ) is 
formulated and presented below, followed by sub-questions (SQs) which will be discussed 
extensively in the operationalization section.  
 
• RQ: What kind of Chinese power mechanisms are operating at and through the 
Confucius Institute at Suez Canal University? 
• SQ: What realms are impacted by activities of this Confucius Institute? 
• SQ: Are these events driven by Chinese Political and Economic interests? If yes, 
then how? 
 
1.2 Why This Thesis?  
Overall, the establishment of CIs around the world has been followed by criticisms. One of 
the critics concerns the issue of power asymmetry which characterizes Sino-African relations. 
These alarms take place where the number of studies done on CIs in Africa are very few and 
lack empirical backgrounds. Therefore, this study can provide concrete data about one of the 
non-studied CI in Africa. One of these non-studied CIs is located at SCU in Egypt.  
 
Sino-Egyptian relations go many years back, and in 2016 the two countries celebrated their 60 
years of diplomatic relations, and as a sign of these ties, they renamed the year of 2016 as a 
cultural year. Egypt is one of the biggest Muslim countries and an influential actor both in the 
Arab world and in Africa. Indeed, the presence of China in Egypt is significant. During my 
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stay in Cairo, I have met many places, which announce their readiness to provide Chinese 
language courses. In addition, Chinese books and flags have also been abundant.  
 
Also, CI at SCU is in a region which has a strategic position, as Suez Canal plays a crucial 
role in global trade and shipment (Miniesy and Adams 2013). Recently, China has announced 
‘One Belt One Road Policy’ which is thought to boost China’s economy. As it is commonly 
understood, maintaining economic growth is extra important for Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) since to a large extent, the legitimacy of CCP to hold power relies on economic growth 
(Shirk 2007; d’Hooghe 2005:90). Consequently, establishing CI, especially in Suez region 
might resemble China’s attempt to invest in this region. Therefore, this thesis aims to uncover 
the power mechanisms which operate at this Institute at the backdrop of China’s extending 
political and economic growth in Africa. 
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2. Method and Methodology  
By reading the previous literature, I have reached the conclusion that there is no consensus 
about the nature and operations of CIs, and that it relatively depends on each case. However, 
since this thesis takes a suspicious position toward CI at SCU, it uses a critical realism 
approach. This method enables the thesis to penetrate the real nature of CI. Though, this thesis 
is not concerned with measuring how much the activities of this CI can influence the Egyptian 
people.  
 
2.1 Ontology and Methodology  
Since this research has a critical standpoint toward CI at SCU, it leans toward a ‘Critical 
Realism’ ontology. This ontology differentiates between the Real, the Actual, and the 
Empirical (Bhaskar 1975). What both critical realism and empirical realism (empiricism) have 
in common is that both argue that human being has access to reality. The different between 
them is that empirical realism (empiricism) claims that all dimensions of objects (reality) are 
observable and there is no object with the hidden feature. While, critical realism as it is shown 
in figure 1 below claims that the world consists of observable and non-observable aspects and 
that even though we observe an event, we might not be able to observe all its structure 
(Bhaskar 1978; 2008). 
 
  
  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Different ontological conceptions of Reality (Based on Wuisman 2005). 
 
The Real 
(Experiences 
Event/Process 
Mechanisms) 
The Actual  
(Experiences 
Events) 
The Empirical  
(Experiences) 
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In the domain of real, which includes both domains of actual and empirical, there are 
unobservable capabilities and mechanisms, which cannot be observed directly, but we can 
observe their effects. Thus, when these mechanisms and capacities are activated, the changes 
take place in the domain of ‘actual’ and which includes both observable and unobservable 
processes and changes. Lastly, the domain of empirical refers to a field where we can observe 
and experience reality directly (Bhaskar 1978; 2008).  
 
Therefore, what is necessary for critical realism in explaining the social world is by disclosing 
the mechanisms that generate those events (Archer 1995). This means that the researchers 
should through causality and structures in the domain of real explain experiences and 
incidents in the realm of actual (Ayer 2011:348). The domain of real can be reached, and a 
profound theoretical understanding of them can be developed by being critical about 
experience and events (Selboe 2002). In this thesis, I seek to explain activities of CI at the 
domain of actual, through causality at the domain of real and to see whether this causal 
mechanism is compatible with and benefits China’s economic and political interests.  
 
The adopted methodological approach for critical realism is called Retroduction. It is an 
approach of reasoning in which researchers can identify mechanisms that can create events 
(Sayer 1992:107). This strategy begins with detecting relations between events within the 
domain of actual. In this step, the task is to identify how such relationships happen and to 
hypothesize from contextualized data, non-observable structures, and mechanisms in the 
domain of real, which can cause these events.  
 
The second step in retroduction is about suggesting a theoretical module. This means that the 
researchers postulate predictions about power mechanisms situated within the domain of real, 
by which if it could function in the suggested way, would explain the interesting event. The 
third step is the deduction, which means a search for evidence, which can either support or 
reject already established assumptions by analyzing the empirical findings. At this level, the 
result from the research should confirm whether the results confirm the hypothetical model or 
not (Lopez and Potter 2005:170; Leca and Naccache 2006:634-635).  
 
2.2 Operationalization   
As discussed earlier, the strategy of retroduction consists of three steps. As a first step, this 
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research has started in the domain of actual by focusing on different but related facts about 
functions of CI at SCU. So, the research has begun to connect different phenomena. The first 
fact is about strategic position of CI at SCU and how this post can be substantial for China. 
The second fact is the role of CI in China’s public diplomacy, which aims to achieve its 
foreign policy goals. The obligation of China’s foreign policy can be summarized to fulfill 
two tasks. The first task is to safeguard country’s national interests abroad, such as enhancing 
China’s international political role and position, and the second task is to provide a conducive 
environment to maintain a stable economic growth. The third fact is the previous literature 
which itself consists of different experiences and facts about functions of CI.  
 
The second step in retroduction is to come up with an assumed structure in the domain of real 
for those phenomena. Thus, I have formulated two assumptions about functions of CI at SCU. 
The assumptions argue that activities of CI at SCU are to support China’s political and 
economic interests and development in Egypt. By political and economic interests, I mean all 
possible advantages that in any manner can benefit politics and economics of Chinese 
governmental and private sectors. The third step is to seek to uncover whether the postulated 
type of power mechanisms exists and operates at the CI by collecting data through interviews 
and published documents and analyzing them through content analyze method.  
 
Therefore, the research will examine activities of CI to search for evidence, which can either 
validate or dismiss the assumptions and will look for some indicators like political and 
economic intentions inherited in activities of CI, among other things making the commercial 
agreement, participating in economic activities. Thus, the research question will be divided 
into smaller questions, so they can be applied to the empirical findings and to capture the 
indicators. These questions are:  
• Why is CI established at Suez Canal University? Since the reasons behind the 
establishment of CI can highlight political and economic interests. 
• What and why are the activities done by CI and what doesn’t CI do? The answers will tell 
me about nature of those activities and what these events mean for China and whether 
these activities or inactivity serve China’s economic and political interests. 
• How does CI operate in general and what is the power relation to the university? The 
answer helps to indicate any power asymmetry in the decision-making process within the 
management of CI or CI link to Suez Canal University. Although the research is not about 
‘Power’ directly, however, power is there and reflects in the relation of CI to its 
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environment. 
• What is the Institute’s outlook? The answer uncovers staff’s perceptions and dominated 
ideologies privileged in the Institute. The answers will tell me about overlooked ideas in 
the Institute. Hence, one can conclude whether those beliefs and aims support China’s 
politics and economic interests. 
 
Then, all answers in addition to other materials will be analyzed by a theory to explain 
different concepts, main dynamics, and the presumed relationship among them (Miles and 
Huberman, 2013:20). In this thesis, the collected material will be analyzed through the lens of 
public diplomacy to explain different activities of CI.  
 
2.3 Method  
A research design reflects a plan that guides the implementation of data collection method and  
data analysis method (Bryman, 2012:46-50). In this thesis, the research design is the 
Atheoretical type of case study where the primary research method is semi-structured 
interviews and analyzing method is a qualitative content analysis. Based on the research 
question, case study research design has been chosen as case studies to investigate the cases in 
question intensively and can reveal the causal mechanism and highlight the unexpected 
patterns in those cases. This means that researchers can pinpoint and study the indicators that 
best represent the hypotheses or the ideas that they are interested in (George and Bennett 
2005). 
 
Thus, by adopting a case study research design, a comprehensive study of CI at SCU will be 
achieved, and specifically in-depth knowledge about its aims directly and indirectly 
observable mechanisms and interests operating at this Institute will be gathered. This will 
enable me to find evidence for either substantiating or discrediting assumptions about the 
Chinese interests and power mechanisms working at this Institute.  
 
However, using a case study has some limitations. The first limitation is the issue of external 
validity or generalization. Case studies are often criticized for being tentative to generalize 
their results. Even though this atheoretical case study does not aim to generate theory, 
however, a theoretical case study can be used in future studies for generating theories (George 
and Bennett 2005:75). In fact, by adding the result of this research to previous small 
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qualitative works, some generalizability can be derived, since some scholars accept 
generalizability inherited from qualitative studies (Duff 2006:70-95; Stebbins 2001:16). 
Another limitation concerns the freedom given to the researcher to decide what materials can 
be used throughout the research to support particular position (Guba and Lincoln 1981:378). 
To overcome this problem, I have utilized a wide range of different data.  
 
I visited Egypt in February 2017 and conducted seven semi-structured interviews, taking in 
consideration Kvale’s recommendation in performing interviews (Kvale 1996). I have 
interviewed three officials at the CI on two occasions and students of CI once. One reason 
behind choosing semi-structured interview is that my research question is asking about 
mechanisms in the domain of real. Based on critical realism the answer should be reached 
through intensive research methods instead of extensive ones. Then, qualitative semi-
structured interviews in this thesis have been used, because they are intensive methods, which 
focus on interactions of different complex mechanisms in the domain of real, which cause the 
events within the realm of actual (Layder 1990). So, by qualitative semi-structure interviews, 
the reason for activities of CI will be revealed. Additionally, semi-structured interview suits 
my research well since my research deals with sensitive topics, such as discussing different 
views about purpose and functions of CI.  
 
However, a semi-structured interview has also weaknesses since the character of the 
interviewee might be unique and the answers become biased (Kvale 1996). To ensure quality 
research, scholars have come forward with following criteria. These criteria are reliability and 
internal-external validity. Reliability means to which extent a study can be replicated. It can 
be difficult for the researcher to replicate this research because it is hard to ‘freeze’ the social 
site and maintain same circumstances and conditions which have surrounded CI. External 
validity refers to the ability of generalization of the findings and which is not strongest feature 
of qualitative research. However, this study can be useful for future studies on other CIs. 
Internal validity is about how correct is the conclusion which depends on how good a relation 
is between observation and developed theoretical idea (Bryman, 2012:389-393). Therefore, to 
obtain high validity and reliability in this thesis triangulation in data collection process has 
been used. Triangulation means using more than one method or source of data in a research 
and which make the study accurate, credible and precise since data are collected from more 
than one individual and more than one type of data (Bryman 2012: 392; Creswell 2002:280). 
So, in addition to conducting interviews with different people in CI, other primary sources 
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such as official documents and books in addition to secondary sources, like research articles 
and media have been used.3  
 
Apparently, CI at SCU and individuals who will be interviewed are chosen based on a 
purposive sampling method. Usually, this method is used in qualitative studies where the 
objects of studies are selected because of their relevance.  
 
The analyzing method is a qualitative content analysis. In this approach, the data are searched 
for hidden meanings and possible explanations (Bryman 2012:565). The process begins with 
coding or indexing, which is a procedure for reflecting the sense of collected data and put 
them into categories. After coding, the data is scrutinized to find themes and to draw sub 
positions, and in the meanwhile, the emerged issues connect to the sub-questions.  
 
2.4 Self-Reflexivity  
Reflexivity means to be critical about materials, which will be used. It is about considering 
what and how something will be written (O’Reilly 2005:211). Thus, by giving the findings 
enough space to demonstrate themselves freely and construct a portrait of the reality, I have 
given a chance to the CI at SCU to defend itself.  
 
Also, since I have conducted interviews, I have been careful about how might I influence the 
perception of the interviewer. Also, because I look like an Egyptian, and I understand their 
culture and language, to a large extent, I have been perceived as an insider. I see it as an 
advantage because it has been easier for the staff at CI to open themselves and talk about the 
Institute since my research topic is a sensitive subject. 
 
Of course, there have been some limitations, which can influence the research. The most 
glaring weakness is my inability to read Chinese language materials and which I tried to 
overcome it by using Google translate and by increasing number of research literature and 
number of interviews. Another limit is about the time that I have spent in Egypt. Even though 
I have been there for almost ten days, still it has been a short period to conduct a full 
                                                      
3 In the same vein, I have considered some criteria to ensure the quality of research articles. The first 
point is about authenticity and which considers genuinely and authorship of material. The second 
aspect is credibility and the awareness which should be paid to neutrality and objectivity of the 
publisher (Bryman 2012: 390-393). 
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comprehensive exam of Institute. An additional issue is the lack of a real diary for activities 
of CI, which could facilitate the research somewhat. What is known for me is mostly what my 
interviewees have told me. This could make some activities go without notice. Since most of 
the materials have been gathered from the trustworthy and known publisher and downloaded 
through LUBsearch, the issue of authenticity and credibility has been obtained.  
 
2.5 Ethical Considerations  
The ethical considerations in this thesis will follow recommendations of the Swedish 
Research Council (The Swedish Research Council 2002). I have informed the participants 
about the aim of the research, and they have given their consent. Since I have recorded the 
interviews, I have asked participants for their approval. Besides, since my interviewees have 
high positions in CI’s managements, and management of SCU and departing from no harm 
policy and to avoid any problem for them 
in the future, their real names are not used 
in the thesis. Instead, their names have 
been changed to Li, Tang and Shi. Their 
gender also have been neutralized with a 
single gender and which will be used 
throughout the thesis. I have not asked for 
written consent because written consents 
are not common in Egypt and thus to ask 
about a such would make the participant 
uncomfortable and would affect the 
interview. The gathered data are only used 
for this thesis, and confidentiality is 
ensured. Also, all data assembled from 
interviews are saved in a safe place, and 
only I have access to them.  
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3. Confucius Institutes  
3.1 The History of Establishment of Confucius Institute  
In 2004, the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), which operates 
under the supervision of the Chinese Ministry of Education, officially announced the 
establishment of the first CI in South Korea. Some author connects the idea of the 
establishment of CIs at the beginning of the new century to rise of the new generation in CCP, 
like Hu Jintao who has emphasized the concept of ‘Harmonious world’ (Hartig 2016:100). 
Some scholars argue that the idea of naming these Institutes ‘Confucius Institute’ had been 
suggested by Chen Zhili, previous state councilor for education, as Confucius represents 
Confucianism, which is a symbol of China’s traditional culture (Hartig 2016:102). 
Nevertheless, the name Confucius has been selected not for the sake of Confucianism (Siow 
2011:1). Also, because the top Chinese leaders have realized that Mao Zedong thoughts and 
Marxism-Leninism principles are inefficient in persuading the Chinese public anymore 
(Hartig 2016:103), Also, these principles are not valued by foreign citizens. Therefore, the 
name Confucius has been selected.  
 
According to Hanban, CI is a non-profitable organization which operates under Hanban 
supervision under the Chinese Ministry of Education (Hanban 2010). There are both CI and 
CC which is smaller than CI, and it is Chinese language classroom at primary and secondary 
schools. In addition to CI and CC, there is Confucius teaching point which is a minuscule 
source for teaching Chinese as it organizes lessons in Chinese language, culture, and history 
(Hanban 2010).  
 
3.2 Procedure for Establishment  
There are different ways for establishing CI (Hanban n.d.), and there are different modes of 
operations for CI (Starr 2009). However, the most common way of setting up a CI is the joint 
venture. In this regard, a Chinese organization, which is a university, cooperates with a 
foreign institution, which also tends to be universities to establish a CI (Yang 2010; Hartig 
2016). The Chinese side takes the first informal step by asking foreign institutes and 
universities to host a CI. Nevertheless, officially the project begins when the foreign part 
hands in a requesting letter to Hanban and asks for the establishment of CI. If Hanban 
approves the request, then an agreement between the foreign part and Hanban is made and 
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which usually is a five-year plan. Then, the Chinese part supplies the teaching staff and 
course materials, while the foreign part stands for facilities and administrative staff. The 
management of CI is divided equally by the two parts (Zhao and Huang 2010).  
 
The establishment of CIs in Africa, including CI at SCU, are formally linked to China’s 
foreign aid to Africa. This fact is mentioned in almost every FOCAC submit. In the sixth 
FOCAC summit’s action plan (2016-2018), China has announced its willingness to support 
the establishment of more CIs in the continent (FOCAC 2015). This fact is a direct and 
definite sign of how CI is one part of China’s foreign policy.  
 
3.3 Aim and Activities of Confucius Institutes  
According to Hanban the main aim of CIs is to fulfill the needs of people from different 
countries who want to learn the Chinese language. Moreover, CIs seek to improve their 
understanding of the Chinese language and culture, to enhance educational ties and cultural 
collaboration between China and other countries, and to help to build a harmonious world 
(Hanban n.d.).  
 
Then the constitution of CI and By-laws of CI provide the procedure for how CI can work to 
realize these aims, explicitly by doing following activities. First, teaching Chinese language 
and culture. Second, educating Chinese language teachers. Third, conducting the Chinese 
Proficiency Test Known as (HSK) test which is the translation of The Hànyǔ Shuǐpíng Kǎoshì 
and which equalizes Test Of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). Fourth, promoting and 
exchanging cultural activities and teaching resources with other countries. Sixth, providing 
information and advisory service about China’s education and culture and so on (Hanban n.d).  
 
Today, there are 15 teachers at CI at SCU Institute and who are responsible for performing 
different activities.4 Cultural activities in this Institute consist of different activities, which 
come up to 55 activities per annum (Tang 2017). These activities include managing 
exhibitions, seminars, competitions in speeches, poems, dance, the art of Kong Foo, 
                                                      
4 Of the 15 teachers, there are 13 female teachers and only two male teachers at CI. The management 
told me that they have asked Hanban to have more male teachers and when I asked about the reason 
they said that first because the society around CI is a patriarchy society, and they should take care of 
female teachers. The second reason is that sometimes CI needs to get something done outside of the 
Institute, and male teachers are more capable of performing those tasks. 
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Acrobatics, cooking, and other cultural events. In addition, CI holds HSK test during March 
of every year. HSK test is so popular that students from all over Egypt come to take this test. 
Interestingly, CI sends the exams to China to be corrected by specialists.  
 
Also, Hanban states that “CI shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not 
consistent with the missions of Confucius Institutes” (Hanban n.d.). However, this definition 
is a vague and an obscure definition because it does not explicitly determine the duty of CIs 
about the lines and how far can CIs go when they do their cultural activities.  
 
Another important issue concerns the issue of funding of CIs. This issue is somewhat vague, 
but the official rule is equal financing (Starr 2009). Some studies estimate that Hanban’s 
expenditure at CIs has reached 295 million USD in 2014 (Xu Lin 2015:12), where German 
Goethe Institute has spent 215 million euro in 2015 (Hartig 2016:106). When I discussed this 
issue with management of CI, they refused to answer me and argued that CI at SCU receives 
money in advance based on the preliminary numbers of activities, as Hanban pays per 
activity. At the end of the yea, both parts go through activities done by the Institute and reset 
the account (Tang 2017).  
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4. Literature Review  
4.1 Different Perspectives on Confucius Institute 
At Lund University’s library, precisely LUBsearch, there are 757 publications which contain 
the words Confucius Institute in their titles. By adding the phrase Soft Power to Confucius 
Institute the number decreased to 133, and the number decreased to 29 when the word Africa 
was added to Confucius Institute. By adding the word Egypt, the result reduced to 10 while it 
did not find any publication when the word Suez was added. Therefore, a snowball method 
has been used to find and review more literature on CIs.  
 
The discussions on CIs in previous literature stay at a macro level, and the discussions are 
abstract. Nevertheless, there are also case studies which focus on specific CI, but even though, 
many of the selected CIs are either located in Europe or in the USA (Hartig 2016).  
 
What is clear from previous literature is that there is no consensus among scholars about 
nature of CIs and what these institutes imply. In fact, the standpoints in previous literature can 
be divided into two blocks. The first block criticizes CIs for being a tool in China’s foreign 
policy for exercising soft power (Chey 2008; Ding 2008; Gil 2008), while the second block 
sees CIs as merely language and cultural institutes (Wang and Lu 2008; Starr 2009; Rawnsley 
2009; Hartig 2012b: 2015; Pan, 2013; Wheeler, 2014).  
 
The opinion of most of the Chinese scholars belongs to the second block. They perceive CIs 
as a good ambassador of Chinese culture (Wu 2012:144), or as a successful initiative of 
China’s public diplomacy (Zhang W. 2009:13), or a combination of both China’s public 
diplomacy with its traditional culture (Ji 2012:329). Of course, other Chinese scholars see CIs 
as corrupt and insufficient institutes (Xu 2012, Li R 2008, Wangchao Zhi Shang 2013 cited in 
Hartig 20 16:107).5 
 
Admittedly, a large part of this divide and disagreement on nature of CI and what it means for 
China are ideological and political concerns. These concerns stem from the foundation of CI 
since CI is funded by the Chinese government and it represents the Chinese state which is 
                                                      
5 Also, the project of CI has even been criticized by Chinese Netizens and ordinary people who 
discuss this Institute in consideration to China’s domestic politics and criticize it because they think 
that such Institute is unnecessary (Hartig 2016). 
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ultimately ruled by the CCP (Hartig 2016). In their book ‘China’s Search for Security,’ 
Nathan and Scobell (2012) address this issue by conceptualizing CI as a ‘policy’ in China’s 
grand strategy which is based on the principle of survival of CCP and security of Chinese 
state. Accordingly, China is using different methods, including CI, to expand its activities to 
ensure its interests in the world, all of that to accumulate more power compared to the USA 
and other powerful states (Nathan and Scobell 2012).  
 
4.2 Confucius Institutes as a Soft Power Tool or Not?  
Thereby, the discussion on the project of CI has been drawn into a larger debate over China’s 
soft power. On the one hand, most of the critics argue that CI is, solely, a tool in the hands of 
Chinese authorities. They argue that CI allows authorities to increase their abilities to exercise 
soft power over other countries in various ways (Chey 2008; Ding 2008; Nathan and Scobell 
2012; Whittaker 2013). In their view, issuing propaganda and spreading China’s ideology 
about critical topics, like human rights and minority rights, resemble a way of exercising soft 
power (Ding and Saunders 2006; Hsiao 2008; Nathan and Scobell 2012).  
 
Although CI is part of China’s grand strategy and a tool in China’s foreign policy, Paradise 
(2009) refuses to perceive it as completely a tool for exercising soft power. Because 
according to him, if one departs from Nye’s definition of soft power, which requires exclusion 
of payment while exercising soft power, CI cannot be seen as real soft power project since the 
establishment of CI involves some financial payment from China’s part to another part 
(Paradise 2009:662).  
 
On the other hand, those who reject labeling CI as a soft power project perceive CI as an 
element of public diplomacy and a language and cultural project. They argue that CI is a 
demand driven project and thus the risk of being part of a propaganda project is weak. Hence, 
CI is simply regarded as an institute which only teaches Chinese language and endows with 
Chinese culture (Wang and Lu, 2008; Rawnsley 2009; Hartig 2012a: 2016; Pan, 2013; 
Wheeler, 2014). 
 
In the same context, Yang (2010) has discussed CIs concerning internationalization of 
China’s higher education. He claims that, although several researchers (Chey 2008; 
Kurlantzick 2007; Nye 2007; Ding 2008; Gil 2008) use the theory of soft power to examine 
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CIs, however, they cannot confirm a relation between CIs and China’s global activities, 
especially in relation to internationalization of China’s higher education (Yang 2010:243).  
 
It is worth mentioning that while reviewing the literature, I have met a theme concerning 
different ways of defining the notion of ‘Soft Power’ (Kurlantzick 2007). This disagreement 
leads to various conclusions on nature of CIs. It means that CIs can either be categorized as 
Chinese soft power project or as institutes that teach Chinese language and introduce Chinese 
culture. Even though the notion of soft power was founded by Nye in the 1990’s and 
evaluated afterward, Chinese scholars tend to broaden the intellectual definition of soft power 
to include all types of power except those in military and security sectors (Li, M. 2008). 
According to Li M. (2008) which concludes the Chinese way of seeing soft power, ‘Soft 
power is a soft way of using the power.’ This means using all type of power with care and in a 
rational way to communicate and attract other nations (Ibid).  
 
Another part of literature has extended the discussion of the soft power to the practice of 
‘Censorship’ and ‘Academic Freedom’ by CIs. In this matter, CIs have been criticized for 
having a negative impact on the academic environment in host universities. This position 
believes that Chinese authorities put pressure on CIs to constrain academic freedoms of the 
host universities and to prevent them conducting studies in sensitive topics which are not 
favorable for Chinese authorities (Brady 2008; Chey 2007; Larsson 2008). In the first glance, 
hosting a CI in a university sounds exciting, but many universities refrain from hosting them 
because of some secret agreements and consequences.  
 
In a case study, Larsson (2008) has discussed academic freedom at Stockholm University. On 
the one hand, the staff of University has acquiesced the Chinese embassy in Stockholm for 
setting up the agenda for the Institute, where on the other hand, Kåre Bremer, the rector of 
Stockholm University has refused such claims (Ibid). The Institute in Stockholm university 
was closed in 2014 as the contract between the two parts went out.  
 
In general, lack of in-depth studies on CIs in the previous literature leads to label nature of CI 
differently. Also, what is noticeable about previous literature is that most of them are weak 
and superficial. Because they are neither based on empirical studies nor grasp the essential 
power mechanisms operating through these institutes. Indeed, these studies departures from 
daily practices of CIs (Sharp 2010). 
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5. China’s Foreign Policy  
A review of China’s foreign policy and recent developments are necessary to understand the 
project of CI as the latter is part of China’s foreign policy. 
 
5.1 Economic Aim  
The main tasks of China’s foreign policy are ensuring security and sovereignty, and 
supporting economic development. In fact, assisting economic growth and domestic 
modernization is a significant aim of China’s foreign policy as it maintains internal political 
stability. Because China’s top leaders have realized that legitimacy of CCP to rule the country 
is dependent on ensuring economic growth (d’Hooghe 2005; Hartig 2016). At the sixteenth 
CCP Congress in 2002, a national plan for China has been constructed. The primary objective 
of the program was about transforming Chinese society to a well-off society. This program 
has meant that China’s GDP would have increased four times by 2020 (d’Hooghe 2005:90). 
Then, one important element for reaching this goal has been to have a stable international 
environment, by the foreign policy which would work hard to maintain stability within and 
outside of China as well as to improve China’s international relations (d’Hooghe 2005:90). 
Against this backdrop, China has modernized its foreign policy and has adjusted it to the 
global trend.  
 
5.2 Changes in China’s Foreign Policy  
Apparently, China’s foreign policy has been adapted to the globalized world, and the essential 
alteration is that the core concepts do not inherit from pure Marxism-Leninism ideologies 
anymore. Hence, the theoretical foundations of China’s foreign policy have extended to 
include many modern international values and traditional Chinese norms (Vance 2010). One 
of these newly incorporated model into China’s foreign policy is ‘Confucianism’.6 
 
Incorporation of these new patterns has occurred simultaneously with the reforms taken place 
in China in last decades and which has accelerated the changes in China’s foreign policy. One 
critical juncture in China’s foreign policy is accession of China in 2001 to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and other international agencies. These turning points in China’s foreign 
                                                      
6 Indeed, they do not go introduce the ancient norms of Confucianism to foreign policy and 
‘Confucianism’ is constructed and used as a label. 
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policy have led to increasing of China’s interactions with other countries and simultaneously 
having more impacts on other nations (Rumbaugh and Blancher 2004; Jiang 2008). Until the 
early 2000’s, China’s foreign policy has been guided by the idea of ‘Peaceful development’ 
which stresses China’s readiness for cooperation with other countries and highlights its 
willingness to build a ‘Harmonious’ region and World (Hartig 2016:100). This pattern in 
foreign policy has been demonstrated clearly about Southeast Asia, where China sought to 
reassure the regional countries that China does not intend to go to war and it shares same 
objectives with them (Lynch 2015:155).  
 
However, after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, China’s foreign policy has changed and 
begun to reflect ‘Forward policies’ (Nye 2011; Thayer 2011; Economy 2012). Some analysts 
believe that 2007-2008 global financial crisis has revealed China’s real position in the world 
and has shown how China is more robust compared to the US and other developed countries 
(Lynch 2015:158). Zhao Suisheng (2011-2012) claims that China has begun speaking and 
protesting loudly, in particular against the US and its maneuvers in the South China Sea. In 
2010, for the first time, China had menaced to impose sanctions on the US’ companies 
implicated in an arm selling to Taiwan (Zhao 2011-2012:40-41). Nye (2011) claims that 
China’s foreign policy has shifted as it has begun to make ‘bolder’ claims compared to its 
previous performances (Nye 2011). Among such Chinese claims is a belief that China is 
strong enough to lead the globalization in the world instead of the US. In fact, Xi Jinping has 
explicitly stated this position during the World Economic Forum in 2017 as he has argued that 
China is willing to take over the global role of the US in the world and become a pioneer in 
globalization (Xi 2017).  
 
The sense that China is strong is shared by many Chinese analysts who acknowledge and 
support China’s position in a multipolar world. However, an increase of China’s power or 
‘China’s Rise’, which reflects in its foreign policy, has made other countries feel 
uncomfortable. Therefore, some Chinese politicians, like Hu Jintao, prefer to use the notion of 
‘Development’ instead of ‘Rise’ in their political dictionary (Wang 2017:28), because 
Chinese government thinks that using the word ‘Rise’ might make other countries feel 
worried about this change and might bring hostility. In other words, it might create a ‘Security 
dilemma’ which already characterizes the Sino-American relations (Nathan and Scobell 
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2012:12).7 
 
Nonetheless, attention to China’s rise and what it might imply for other countries in the world 
has increased their concerns. Apparently, this concerns rely on a ‘Realist’ theoretical 
perspective and precisely on a ‘Zero-sum game’ principle (Nathan and Scobell 2012). As a 
realist scholar, J. Mearsheimer (2014) in his articles, ‘Can China Rise Peacefully?’, argues 
that in the longer term, China’s rise will pose a threat to the international order and makes the 
world unstable and insecure (Mearsheimer 2014).  
 
Indeed, ‘China threats’ narratives, which is mainly dominated in the US, has been confronted 
by Western and Chinese scholars like Nye (2005) and Zhang (2015). Also, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping has opposed this perception and has argued that China’s economic rise has 
benefited the world and that China will be a source of trouble for the world if it remains 
undeveloped and does not rise (Xi 2013).  
 
Then, one of the principal aims of China’s foreign policy becomes to reassure different 
countries that rise of China will remain peaceful. Thus, China has sought to work on how it 
wants to be perceived by other nations (Shambaugh 2016). In this respect, China has brought 
in the project of ‘Soft power’ and strengthened its activities of ‘Public diplomacy’ as part of 
its foreign policy (Shambaugh 2016; Economy 2016). In the same vein, China’s foreign 
policy has been inspired by the idea of producing a positive image of China (Zhu Z. 2010:6).  
 
Some scholars claim that the idea of China’s soft power developed by some Chinese scholars 
during 1990’s, but David Shambaugh (2016) argues that the idea started at the beginning of 
20 00. He claims that the idea began with the translation of Josef Nye’s book to Chinese, and 
also when the Chinese authorities found ‘China threats’ narratives in the US and which 
opposed China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ theory (Shambaugh 2016).  
 
However, some scholars, like Elizabeth Economy (2016), disagree on the existence of 
China’s soft power and argue that China’s soft power is not organic as it is not entirely 
happening on the ground. She claims that there is a gap between Chinese domestic reality and 
                                                      
7 The notion of ‘Security Dilemma’ was developed by R. Jarvis (1978) and means that, when interests 
of states intersect, increase of power of a state raises the fear and insecurity of another states (Jarvis 
1978). 
 28 
what is perceived to be China’s soft power (Economy 2016). Another reason that weakens the 
idea of China’s soft power is China’s political system, which is neither valued nor attractive 
for other countries (Shambaugh 2016).  
 
5.3 Sino-African Relations  
Political relations  
China’s political relationship with Africa goes back to early 1950’s. In the 1950’s and 1960’s 
China’s foreign policy has predominantly been about spreading communism and 
revolutionary ideologies in the continent (Kurlantzick 2007; Zhang 2011; Wang 2011). By 
supporting Africans’ anti-colonialism movements on the continent, China has sought to show 
that those struggles resemble some extend Mao’s revolutionary fight and universality of 
Mao’s thought since they have reached the whole world (Kurlantzick 2007; Zhang 2011). In 
the 1980’s, China’s foreign policy toward Africa changed, and the number of activities 
decreased. It is mainly because China’s foreign policy shifted toward economic cooperation 
with other countries due to reduced radical thinking by Deng Xiaoping which illustrates by 
political and economic reforms. By the end of the 1990’s and beginning of the new century, 
China’s foreign policy has shifted where it has begun to strengthen old and establishes new 
ties with African countries (Christopher 2011; Garver 2016).  
 
Recently, China has shaped its African foreign policy in a way that in a short time, it has been 
able to construct economic and diplomatic relations with many African countries (Kurlantzick 
(2007). In general, experts have evaluated China’s foreign policy for Africa negatively and 
criticized its increased influence in the continent. Much of the critics focus on ‘China’s soft 
power’ in Africa, where China utilizes resources to produce attraction and efficiency in the 
continent (Kurlantzick 2007; Brautigam 2015).  
 
Today, China is one of the biggest overseas partners for many African countries. A study 
done by Kim Yi Dionne (2016) has shown that 63% of people in 36 African countries believe 
that China is doing something positive in their countries. In his book, ‘Charm Offensive: How 
China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World,’ Kurlantzick gives some explanation for 
China’s positive image among African countries. He points out how demands for China’s 
model of development, successful diplomacy and Human Resource Development (HRD) 
programs are utilized by China as methods to make China attracted for African countries 
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(Kurlantzick 2007). Among these methods are the non-conditional aid and the non-
interference policy.  
 
In fact, HRD has been mentioned in the sixth FOCAC action plan (2016-2018), as China 
announced its willingness to support capacity building of the African countries through 
offering HRD. One part of HRD program includes the establishment of CI. China has 
encouraged the foundation of more CI in as it has welcomed the inclusion of Chinese 
language education as part of national education systems by some African countries (FOCAC 
2015).  
 
These HRD programs have been doubted by different scholars. One of them is Kenneth King 
(2013) who is a prominent scholar in Sino-African relations and who discusses China’s HRD 
in his book, ‘China’s Aid and Soft Power in Africa: The case of Education and Training’ that 
China’s HRD. He argues that China wields soft power through its HRD programs (King 
2013). Like King, Peter Kragelund (2014) has come to an almost same conclusion where he 
focuses on CI as one component of China’s HRD program in Africa. He has found out that 
China exercises soft power through this Institute by training future political and economic 
leaders of the country. However, he does not neglect the fact that CI benefits the university 
and the country in general (Kragelund 2014). 
 
Economic Relations  
The Sino-African relationship has resulted in the establishment of Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, (Kurlantzick 2007; Brautigam 2015). However, the most 
crucial task of China’s foreign policy toward Africa is to manage economic relations with 
Africa where China has become the biggest trading partner with this continent in 2009 
(Kurlantzick 2011). Today, China has several special economic zones in Africa, like Chinese 
Economic Zone in Suez region in Egypt (Antonio and Ma 2015). The Suez region is almost 
120 km and located along the Suez Canal.  
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Figure 2. China’s Special Economic Zones based on Antonio and Ma (2015) 
 
The reason for establishing these special economic zones can boil down to three reasons. The 
first reason is to explore new markets. China seeks to expand its access to new markets in 
Africa to include new places where people’s purchasing power is expected to increase in the 
future. Also, China’s market seeking goes beyond Africa, as China seeks to enter the 
European market benefiting from advantages provided by the African markets, like cheap 
labor and short distance. China’s investment already increased from 5 million USD in 2000 to 
50 million USD in 2008. The second aim is to secure access to natural resources. Because 
China relies heavily on the oil produced in Africa as an act to ensure its continuous access to 
natural resources with low price which is privileged for a stable economic growth (Taylor 
2006; Corkin 2008; Lee and Shalmon 2008). Also, China is interested in raw materials too, as 
it explores and exports them to China and rest of Africa. The third reason is about improving 
its strategic and logistic position in Africa. By having different special economic zones 
connected by infrastructure, an industrial network will be created. This system will reduce the 
investments risks and attract more Chinese investors into Africa.  
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Some researchers have a different opinion and argue that the reasons are somewhat to do with 
China’s soft power in Africa. They claim that by these special economic zones, China seeks 
to demonstrate its power and development to African and western countries. Also, these 
special economic zones help economy of China to get rid of labor intensive industries which 
are not profitable in China (Brautigam and Tang 2011).  
 
China’s aid to Africa  
Another pole in China’s African relations is concerned with China’s ‘aid’ to Africa which can  
be divided into three periods. The first time is related with China’s ideology exportation to 
Africa and which increased from 52 million RMB in 1952 to 337 RMB in 1972. The second 
period was between the mid1970’s to 1990’s and which witnessed a decrease in aid given to 
Africa, partly because of reduction in China’s GNP. The third phase in China’s aid to Africa 
has begun since the 1990’s and which continues to reflect different principles, such as win-
win strategy, common political interests and China’s responsibility as a ‘Global power’ (Li 
Xiaoyun 2010).  
 
Since China is not a member of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) the nature and 
the number of aid given to Africa is not clear. Brautigam is a pioneer scholar who discusses 
this issue is in her books, ‘Will Africa Feed China?’ (2015), and ‘The Dragon’s Gift: The 
Real Story of China in Africa’ (2009). She and another scholar like Mohan (2015) are 
suspicious of this activity and argue that since China is a state where transparency is weak, it 
becomes difficult to acknowledge that China is granting Africa aid. Brautigam claims that not 
all the numbers reported by Chinese authorities are correct and much of financial supports 
provided by China seems to be a different type of loans (Brautigam 2008; 2009; 2015). She 
adds that the number can’t be measured in the same way as it is done by Development 
Assistance Committee (Glosny 2006; Lancaster 2007; Jacoby 2007; Mohan 2015). Also, one 
critical difference between China and other DAC donors is that China grant aid to all 
countries unconditionally, without considering the type of governments in recipient countries 
(Brautigam 2015).  
 
5.4 Sino-Egyptian Relations  
China has had a good relationship with different African countries, and one of them is Egypt 
which is one of the first African countries that have recognized the independence of China. 
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China-Egypt relations are mostly characterized by the economic activities and cooperation 
between the two nations (Hatab 2012; Looy 2006).  
 
During the past few years, Egypt has turned to China to meet its economic demands that 
could not be fulfilled with its relations with other foreign countries, such as European 
countries due to the financial crisis. Recently, Egypt has emphasized its economic ties with 
China in different sectors, such as infrastructures and investment.  
 
As it has been mentioned earlier, one of China’s exclusive economic zone is in Egypt. Area of 
the zone is 6km and it has been granted by Egypt for Chinese companies. The responsible 
developer for this zone is Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA). This 
developer is a Chinese State Owned Enterprise (SOE) and has signed a 45-year contract with 
the economic authority of this region. This economic zone can benefit Chinese companies in 
several ways, for instance by making them pay fewer taxes than in China and giving them 
Egyptian certificate of origin. The latter enables them to export their goods to more 
destinations benefiting from Egypt’s international trade agreements. Chinese companies can 
use these economic zones as a departure point to the rest of Africa as well as to the Middle 
East. Until 2014, there have been 32 projects registered in this area with an investment 
estimated at more than 90 million USD.  
 
Recently, bilateral relations between the two countries have strengthened, especially after the 
announcement of ‘One Belt One Road’ policy (Sudeshna Sarkar 2016). Since ‘One Belt One 
Road’ plan goes through Suez Canal, Ismailia city becomes one of the most important stations 
for this policy. Another importance of Egypt for China is Egyptian market for Chinese firms. 
Thus, it seems logical that China is investing in Egypt in a different sector (Magdy Amer 
2016; Miniesy and Adams 2013). One of this investment is establishing CI at SCU and Cairo 
University.  
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6. Theoretical Framework  
In this part, public diplomacy as a theoretical lens will be presented followed by a definition 
of ‘Power.’  
 
6.1 Public Diplomacy  
The term of public diplomacy is used in different disciplines, and obviously, there is no single 
definition for it. Public diplomacy means serving national interests through affecting foreign 
governments by influencing their citizens through communication and involvement 
(Frederick 1993:229). Therefore, concerning CI at SUC, public diplomacy as a theory is used 
to point to the hidden aspects of reality and to highlight the power mechanisms operating 
within the domain of real.  
 
The content of public diplomacy works in three domains, namely in the domestic and 
international domains to ensure the security of a country, in the economic sector to facilitate 
economic goals by enhancing trade, and the cultural domain to increase mutual 
understandings and non-governmental diplomacy (Leonard et al. 2002:10).  
 
6.2 Old and New Public Diplomacy  
Throughout the last decades, there has been a general paradigm shift from governmental 
public diplomacy to a new public diplomacy which has drawn in a vast number of new actors 
in the field of public diplomacy (Hocking 2008; Pamment 2013). In the previous era, 
especially during the cold war, public diplomacy has meant to be a way of persuasion, 
(Melissen et al. 200 5). The state, and predominantly foreign ministry, has been the leading 
actor for coordination of communication between the audience in internal and international 
domains. Thus, the focus has been on the fulfillment of state’s expectations and exchange of 
information in a single direction from the sender to the receiver where the senders determine 
the message they want to send. The involved actors often utilize the available methods in a 
logical manner and which leads to a low number of interactions between the sender and the 
recipient (Pamment 2013:3). The old public diplomacy is characterized by its governmental, 
top-down structured features (Hocking 2005:65-66).  
 
In contrast to old public diplomacy, the idea of new public diplomacy is more about 
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producing desired understanding and image about oneself (Melissen et al. 2005). The new 
public diplomacy moved from being a state-centric form of communication towards a 
diplomacy which aims to strengthen the connection between non-traditional actors at home 
and abroad. This means that a vast number of new actors, such as Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), which encourages dialogue and cooperation has emerged (Hocking 
2005:38-39; Melissen 2005:12). In the case of China’s public diplomacy, CIs are good 
examples of these new actors. Also, the new public diplomacy encourages two ways of 
communications as a way of understanding each other (Zaharna et al. 2013:1). This point is 
essential for China since it can send and receive messages with foreign publics to reduce the 
misunderstandings about itself and the way it has been represented in international media (Su 
S. 2008; Yu Y. 2014 cited in Hartig 2016:59).  
 
In sum, both old and new public diplomacies in foreign affairs are mediation to maintain and 
to promote national interests. In this thesis, public diplomacy is understood as a means for 
countries to enhance communication networks, to make more friends and to reduce the 
numbers of enemies. Also, it is recognized as an approach to develop political and economic 
relations, to encourage export and foreign investment, to found relationships with NGOs and 
public sector and to work for winning both hearts and minds of foreign publics (Hartig 
2016:35). In this regard, public diplomacy is one dimension of political communication and 
incorporates all forms of dialogue and interaction initiated by governmental actors for seeking 
particular aim (Melissen 2005). Also, public diplomacy includes the communications between 
on one hand media and non-political actors and the other hand the politicians about these 
activities (McNair 2011). Both new and old public diplomacy approaches are relevant for 
studying CI since this Institute fits into both approaches due to its hybrid features. On the one 
hand, CI is not an entirely autonomous organization, and it is supervised by the ministry of 
education, and on the contrary, for most of the time, CI functions as an NGO.  
 
6.3 Importance of Image and Reputation in Public Diplomacy  
Image, in studies on public diplomacy, refers to profile and information in people’s thoughts. 
The image becomes necessary because of the very fact that reality is so complicated which 
makes the people simplify the reality by saving it as images (Lippman 1922 cited in Hartig 
2016:5). Hence, images are intellectual pictures in people’s mind and which can be 
constructed and influenced through communication and the messages sent by foreign actors 
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(Manheim and Albritton 1984:645).  
 
China seeks to create a positive image in the world. It seeks to present itself as a reliable 
economic actor and politically stable country which develops peacefully (d’Hooghe 2011:24). 
Due to the speed of communication in a globalized world, the possibility of a country’s image 
affecting the international position of that country has intensified. Therefore, image brushing 
becomes necessary in tandem with ever increasing of the importance of foreign citizens 
(Hertz 1981:184).  
 
In addition to the image, reputation of a country is also a crucial factor in public diplomacy. 
Both image and reputation are nations’ assets which can produce either supportive or 
incapacitate conditions for a country’s unique arrangements (Leonard et al. 2002:9). Thus, 
countries with positive images and good reputations can forge coalitions and expand their 
international influence, using their what perceived to be ‘Soft Power’ (Kinsey and Chung 
2013:6).  
 
6.4 Cultural Diplomacy, Soft power, and Propaganda 
The main reason behind interchangeable between the cultural diplomacy and soft power is 
due to the paradigm shift in public diplomacy. This development has led to the emergence of 
new actors and sharing new areas of responsibilities with other approaches. One approach is 
cultural diplomacy which is about government’s effort to promote national interest abroad by 
utilizing cultural resources and activities (Aguilar 1996). Cultural diplomacy can be seen 
either as an element of public diplomacy (Cull 2009) or as a distinct but interlaced approach 
to public diplomacy (Melissen 2005:22). Both cultural diplomacy and (new) public diplomacy 
stress engagement instead of dictating the message and two-way communications with the 
foreign public which aim to establish long and stable ties rather than short policy driven 
relations. What distinct cultural diplomacy from public diplomacy is that the former should 
only be performed by non-governmental actors, where the latter can be carried out by any 
player (Melissen 2005:21-23).  
 
In academic communities, soft power is a contested term. However, what is clear about soft 
power is that it is not same as public diplomacy. Even though soft power and public 
diplomacy belong to the communication sphere, they refer to different parts of 
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communication and have various functions (Rawnsley 2012:123). Public diplomacy is the 
means of communicating with foreign countries and a precondition to soft power, while soft 
power is an end in communication (Hartig 2016:49). Simply, soft power is the capacities of 
society to attract others to itself, because of existing characteristics within that country, while 
public diplomacy is the tool to do that (Shambaugh 2013:209).  
 
As a term, soft power has established itself in the Chinese politic discourse since the Chinese 
politicians began to use it frequently (Hayden 2012). For instance, it has been utilized by both  
Hu Jintao in 2007 and 2012, and by Xi Jinping in 2014 (Hu J. 2007:2012; Xi J. 2014). For 
Nye, soft power is the ability to get what one wants using attraction instead of coercion and 
payment (Nye 2005). For Chinese, soft power is accepted to be one part of China’s 
comprehensive national power and which seeks to defend China’s effort to become a great 
power again (Hartig 2016:64). Guo X. (2009) explains the soft power as things like 
competence of politicians, quality of politics and the ability to create international supportive 
conditions (Guo 2009).  
 
Another near term to public diplomacy is propaganda. Even though public diplomacy is not 
concerned with only activities of state anymore, it is still the chief organizer. Therefore, 
public diplomacy is usually accused of being part of the official propaganda and which open a 
discussion on whether every state act should be perceived as propaganda or public diplomacy 
(Zaharna 2004:219). In China’s case, distinguishing the two terms becomes more difficult as 
China’s activities are so fuzzy and which lead the skeptics to think that public diplomacy is 
only an indirect term for propaganda (Ranwesly 2013:148). Both propaganda and public 
diplomacy seek to influence the perception of the foreign public, but what distinct the two 
approaches are that in public diplomacy actors listen to the foreign public wherein 
propaganda the states do not do that and only seek to persuade the international public 
(Melissa 2005:18).8 
 
6.5 China’s Public Diplomacy  
In tandem with China’s ever increasing interaction with the rest of the world, its dependency 
on other foreign countries has grown too, and vice versa. Hence, public diplomacy has 
                                                      
8 It is worth mentioning that in China’s political dictionary propaganda and soft power are used 
openly and mean something positive. 
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become crucial for China’s foreign policy and its general diplomacy. In general, China’s 
public diplomacy has three intertwined aims. The first objective is to enlighten the world that 
China should not be feared. This purpose is mostly related to China’s threat narratives and 
which some scholars argue that it is caused by lack of understanding and misinterpretation of 
China’s behavior by foreign publics (Han Z. 2011:18; Zhou H. 2012). Subsequently, China 
seeks to produce a correct image about itself, which can replace the widespread image in the 
world that is created by western media (d’Hooghe 2005:93; Kejin 2012). The second goal is 
the attempt to create a positive image which presents China as a stable and reliable economic 
international partner that work on making all Chinese achieve prosperity. The third aim is to 
show that China is a trustworthy and responsible member of the international community. It 
wants to show the world that it can participate to maintain peace and stability in the world 
(d’Hooghe 2005:93).  
 
6.6 Definition of Power  
Even though my main research question is not about power per se, from a critical realist point 
of view possibility of management of CI to affect other parts to accomplish certain results 
exists. Then, it is useful to define what ‘Power’ is perceived to be.  
 
Although ‘Power’ can be defined in different ways, those terms used for describing power are 
interchangeable and often overlap, which makes it difficult to draw clear boundaries among 
the various definitions. In this thesis, the definition of power is an amalgamation of both 
‘Productive Power’ (Foucault 1983) and ‘Institutional power’ (Keohane 1988; Finnemore and 
Barnett 1999) due to their necessity for the research. Because each definition applies to a 
certain domain and it highlights different manners for social relations to shape and constrain 
the capacities of actors to decide their fortunes (Barnett and Duvall 2005:68). 
 
In general, power is conceptualized as the creation of effect by and through social relations 
which these social relations can later form and control actor’s capacity to decide its fate 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005:39). Power has two dimensions, the first one is the type of social 
relations which shape actor’s ability, namely interaction, and constitution and the second 
dimension is about the features of those social relations, in other words how direct or diffuse 
those relations are (Barnett and Duvall 2005:45).  
 
 38 
Productive power is the creation of all social subjects with different social powers by use of 
knowledge and discursive praxis. This form of power functions through diffused social 
relations which produce actors’ social capacities, and which also influence its interests and 
self-understanding (Barnett and Duvall 2005:48). According to Foucault, even though actors 
do not control social processes, still, these social processes are affected by actors’ meaningful 
practices (Foucault cited in Gaventa 2003:3). Therefore, productive power is also concerned 
with what goes beyond the structure and which is about meanings and network of social 
forces and which lead to consider that power is present everywhere (Foucault 1978:93). 
Among these social forces are discourses and process of knowledge production by which 
explanation and interpretation are created, existed and reshaped (Barnett and Duvall 2005:48). 
Here, discourse is not defined as Habermas definition, which is about dialogue and 
communication between actors, and rather it is understood as settings of social relations of 
power because they determine everyday traditions of life and the social spheres of action 
(Foucault 1983).  
 
Institutional power works in a way to enable an actor to influence and exercise power on other 
actors because of institutional relations between the two parts (Barnett and Duvall 2005:5 1). 
The power is applied by actors’ indirect control over other actors through both official and 
unofficial institutions that mediate between the two parts. In this regard, an actor operates 
through the regulations and policies that set up those institutions and which lead and control 
the conditions which shape either activity or passivity of others. Thereby, an actor can 
through institutional agreements forms the policy process in a way that can remove every 
subject of disagreement between the two parts.  
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7. Results and Discussion  
This section will answer the research question by analyzing the evidence to either substantiate 
or discredit already established assumptions about CI at SCU. Departing from critical realism 
ontology, which explains the social world by unveiling the mechanisms that generate the 
events, this thesis seeks to reach the reasons behind activities within the domain of real to see 
whether they benefit and are compatible with China’s economic and political interests.  
 
The discussion consists of two sections, one section for political activities and another section 
for economic activities. It is worth mentioning that the findings for economic parts have been 
more conclusive compared to the political part where the evidence have been more evasive 
and harder to highlight. Also, some of the activities overlap and fit in both sections, which 
make drawing a sharp line between the two sections difficult.  
 
7.1 Activities Promoting Political Interests  
In this section, different interrelated activities of CI, which are driven by China’s political 
interests will be discussed. Some of the activities motivated by political interests are 
providing scholarships and exchange of students, broadcasting of programs, image brushing 
tool, initiation, and mediation. Another political action is about influencing the decisions of 
management of SCU and interfering and affecting the autonomy of SCU.  
 
7.1.1 Influential Role of Confucius Institute at Suez Canal University  
As CI at SCU is an actor in China’s public diplomacy, it seeks to serve China’s national 
interests. A substantiation on this statement can be seen in how the management of CI has 
succeeded to influence the management of SCU through social relations. CI has succeeded to 
convince management of SCU for establishing different institutes and programs at the 
university.  
 
One of these established institute is the faculty of languages at SCU in 2016. CI has 
succeeded to persuade management of university that there is a need for the establishment of 
this new faculty, which teaches the Chinese language besides few other languages (Li 2017). 
In addition to previous sources for teaching the Chinese language, this new department of 
Chinese literature makes SCU the first university in Egypt and probably in Africa that 
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provides three different sources for studying the Chinese language.  
 
In 2016, CI has convinced management of SCU to establish a Chinese cultural club and a 
museum for Guo Moruo, a famous Chinese poet at SCU (Tang 2017). Also, CI plans to create 
a center for teaching Chinese acupuncture at the University. Tang said that “The[acupuncture] 
center will work as propaganda for Chinese traditional medicine even though our [CI] first 
and last task is cultural” (Tang 2017).  
 
This power to convince is partly because some of the management of CI has a high position at 
SCU and also because of close personal relationship with the managements. Additionally, the 
teachers at CI are employees at SCU. They work as Chinese teachers in the faculty of 
language and faculty of literature at SCU. One interviewee argues that an important reason for 
the success of CI is due to acceptance of many requests of CI by the management of SCU, as 
managements of CI occupy important positions at SCU (Shi 2017).  
 
Undeniably, the evidence on how CI has freedom and space to outline itself and use its power 
in the realm of the university is not concerned only about these activities, and further 
activities will be described throughout the discussion.  
 
7.1.2 Facilitating of Teaching Arabic  
A confirmation on the operation of Chinese political interests at CI is about facilitating of 
teaching Arabic to the Chinese which is something that goes beyond the official aim of CI. CI 
has convinced SCU to establish a section for teaching the Arabic language at Beijing 
Language and Culture University. The reason for this move has been to help Chinese ministry 
of education to overcome its lack of education resources in Arabic teaching. Because in 
China, the number of Ph.D. programs is few since there are only a few specialists who have 
the right to supervise Ph.D. students. Consequently, studying Arabic at an advanced level 
inside China has become involved. Simultaneously, CI has convinced management of SCU in 
establishing a special program for teaching Arabic which mainly directs itself Chinese and 
foreigner students (Tang 2017). This program teaches Arabic at both undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels. Interestingly, one of the CI officials is already enrolled in this program 
and is studying Arabic at Ph.D . level (Li 2017).  
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Further evidence which substantiates the Chinese interests operating at CI concerns language 
lessons. CI holds Arabic Lessons at TEDA in Ain Sokhna to teach Chinese staff Arabic. 
Establishment of Arabic classrooms for Chinese businessmen and women in TEDA is a result 
of a protocol signed between CI and management of special economic zone in Ain Sokhna 
(Ibrahim 2010). In fact, the establishment of Arabic classrooms by CI is astonishing, because 
this Institute should not teach a foreign language at all. The motive behind providing Arabic 
lessons in Ain Sokhna is to facilitate works of Chinese businessmen and women and which 
also aim to reduce barriers facing investment of Chinese companies in Egypt (Li 2017; Shi 
2017).  
 
7.1.3 Language Activities as Communication Channels  
Based on findings, which present in this thesis, CI does more than basic language and cultural 
activities that aim to make Egyptian people speak Chinese, even though speaking the Chinese 
language still benefits China in various ways, such as improving China’s image and 
reputation and facilitating trade between people of the two countries. A substantiation for this 
claim is a statement by the management of CI which says that, although the aim of CI at first 
place is to spread language and culture, still cultural activities of CI can serve politics and 
economy goals (Li 2017; Tang 2017).  
 
Also, the fact that establishing new institutes at SCU, which has been discussed in previous 
part, are in themselves advantages for China, they also function as communication channels 
between China and Egypt. The increase of interactions and engagement, which is a technique 
in the new public diplomacy, helps to reshape China’s image and reputation in mind of 
Egyptian people. In this regard, CI has submitted a request to open a CC in the city of 
Helwan, and which has been approved by Hanban. Also, CI plans to establish a CC in one of 
Ismailia’s high school. When I was in Egypt in February, CI was communicating with British 
University in Cairo to establish a teaching point there. One interviewee said that if the 
teaching point succeeds, management of CI will try to convince management of the British 
University to open Chinese language section at the University (Shi 2017). In 20 Mars 2017, 
the two parts agreed upon opening a Confucius teaching point. Establishing Confucius 
teaching point reflects CI aim to expand.  
 
CI frequently visits different high schools to encourage rectors and students to teach and 
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respectively learn Chinese. During my stay, I have witnessed how various agencies, mostly 
educational actors, visit this CI. One example is when a rector of a high school in Ismailia 
visited CI. Apparently, this high school has been visited by CI previously, and the rector was 
back to ask CI for a second visit. The CI has welcomed the idea and has even suggested 
establishing a Chinese teaching point at the high school.  
 
In sum, an increase in the number of Chinese teaching sources would increase communication 
channels between China and Egypt. Adding a new source for teaching the Chinese language 
supports China’s political and economic interests. Because the exercise of language can 
transfer forces that create attraction among people (Bially Mattern 2005). Subsequently, 
increasing  in the number of communication channels means the increased in the likelihoods 
of Egyptian people to learn more about China and which results in the creation of an 
encouraging environment for mutual understanding. Consequently, China would be able to 
reshape its image in mind of people of Egypt.  
 
7.1.4 Confucius Institute as an Image Brushing Tool  
As it has been pointed in the previous part, another aim of public diplomacy is to increase 
mutual understanding and to improve the image of a country by different means. Even though 
both Chinese and Arab people belongs to the east or orient civilization, Egyptian people has 
lacked a detailed image about China because of the distance between the two countries (Tang 
2017). However, by establishing CI, the misunderstandings and lack of knowledge about 
China have been reduced, since CI has been a significant source of spreading information 
about China (Tang 2017; Li 2017). The distributed information has created a new image and 
profile of China in the mind of people.  
 
When I discussed the ambition of CI at SCU with Tang, who has one of the highest positions 
at the Institute, she has argued that one main reason behind the establishment of CI has been 
needed of China to improve its image in the mind of people of the world (Tang 2017). This 
explanation is a clear sign of how CI is a tool in China’s public diplomacy and how political 
interests are operating at CI. According to Tang (2017), China has understood that to change 
its image in the mind of Egyptian people as well as in the mind of people of other Arab 
countries using its ‘Smooth power’ such as cultural power is essential. In real view, language 
and culture are soft power elements and which “China is investing its cultural power to 
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change the wrong image about itself, which summarizes China as only Mao Zedong and 
workers who wear blue work suits” (Tang 2017).  
 
In the same vein, the discussion on the aim of CI has dragged importance of China’s image 
for its foreign policy especially considering its image as a global (economic) partner. Tang 
(2017) has added that image of China becomes important as “[China] seeks to penetrate in 
Africa and Persian Gulf states to ensure its access to power resources so it can maintain a 
steady economic growth rate.” (Tang 2017). Thus, to break through different countries, China 
seeks to improve its global image and reputation. Penetrating in various countries, especially 
in Arab Countries comes as a precondition for implementing its ‘One Belt One Road’ Policy. 
Then, CI at SCU is a necessity to enable China implements its foreign policy.  
 
Consequently, the history of the establishment of CI at SCU is partly related to an image 
brushing project and which also can be found in Sino-Egyptian relations. In 2006, the Chinese 
premier, Wen Jiabao, has visited Egypt and stressed the need for increasing cultural ties with 
Egypt to increase ‘common understanding’ (Jiabao 20 06). In the same year, the two countries 
have celebrated their 50th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations by 
ratifying several cultural agreements, where they have agreed upon enhancing cultural 
exchanges, in which CI is one of the results (Tang 2017).  
 
In 2009, Chinese Premier inaugurated China- Arab Cooperation Forum at the Arab League 
headquarters in Cairo. In the meantime, Wen Jiabao gave a speech about China’s role in the 
future and which has focused on dialogue and cooperation as the way to reach a 
mutual understanding. Jiabao said: “Cultural exchanges will help deepen mutual 
understanding ..., strengthen the bond of friendship and build strong public support for our 
friendship.” As CI is an outcome of the cultural agreement, it continues to reflect the 
development in Sino-Egyptian relations (Tang 2017). In this regard, CI is a tool in China’s 
foreign policy seeks to realize its public diplomacy goal, which by cultural activities are 
spreading knowledge about China and improving its image in front of Egyptian publics.  
 
7.1.5 Political Censorship  
Through its public diplomacy, China is making a lot of efforts to improve its political and 
economic image and reputation in the mind of people, including Egyptian publics. One of 
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these activities is the distribution of Confucius Institute Magazine (CIM), which is issued by 
Ministry of Education in China. Although CIM states clearly that its ambition is to spread 
Chinese language and culture, still it covers economic and political subjects.  
 
In addition to participating in publishing and distribution of CIM, political censorship is 
among other activities of CI which seek to reshape China’s political image and reputation. 
Political censorship is one of CI seldom clear political endeavors. Political censorship 
concerns topics like ‘Human Rights in China,’ ‘One China policy’ (regarding Taiwan) and 
‘Falun Gong.’ China’s foreign policy is characterized by non-intervention policy which also 
is preferred this strategy in Egyptian foreign policy. This shared approach has created an 
invisible agreement between Chinese management at CI and its Egyptian counterparts not to 
discuss these topics.  
 
As CI has declared its reluctance to intervene in Egypt’s domestic politics, Egyptian parts do 
not push CI to address these sensitive issues. One of the interviewees argued that not only 
Egypt respects CI policy as one part of China’s foreign policy, but also it supports China in 
the League of Arab States (Li 2017; Tang 2017). Consequently, no one discusses these non-
preferable topics for China and which are perceived by Egyptian as issues concerning China’s  
domestic politics. These topics are ‘dead’ themes and are not attractive for the entire 
management of CI. In the CI classrooms, maps of China are hanging on the wall and which 
apparently include Taiwan, the disputed Islands and contested border for local water.  
 
Distribution of information and knowledge about politics of China through different sources 
on the one hand and abandoning information, on the other hand, is reshaping China’s 
political image and seek to present it as a powerful state. In fact, these activities have had 
some impact on Egyptian society even though I have not conducted a survey to measure the 
impact. Still, I have observed how CI has corrected their previous perception about China. For 
instance, some students have claimed that they did not know about China’s new global 
position where some other mentioned China’s role in the UN and other world organizations. 
All this change in perception has been caused by activities done by CI.  
 
7.1.6 Scholarship  
Another advantage for China’s politics comes about Scholarship and students exchange 
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programs. Although a scholarship is an educational event, but still, it has been a key factor in 
spreading information about China and a reason for improving China’s image in Egypt.  
 
There has been a consensus among management of CI that China’s public diplomacy is better 
than the US on making other people follow it. The main reason is that the US uses hard power 
in threatening or convincing other countries, while China uses ‘Soft power’ (Tang 2017; Li 
2017).  
 
Management of CI perceives China as a smart country as it uses Foreign Direct Investment (F 
DI), aid and cultural ties, like scholarship and student exchange, to win both hearts and minds.  
Each year China grants almost 200 awards on Master level and Ph.D. level to Egypt. CI at 
SCU is one of the places which awards more scholarships to students than any other institutes 
in Egypt. Interestingly, the slogan of CI at SCU is “Confucius Institute at SCU in Ismailia, 
your gateway to getting a scholarship in China” (CI site). Because to be eligible to get a 
Chinese scholarship, the students need to pass an HSK. CI at SCU is one of the two places 
which provides HSK in Egypt. Further, CI has assisted SCU and Chinese Academy of 
Sciences in signing a letter of intent which includes, among other things, exchange of 
students. It means that each university can send and receive approximately 80 students every 
year.  
 
The role of Egyptian students who come back from China is significant. Naturally, when 
these students return to Egypt, they will be cultural ambassadors for China (Tang 2017; Li 
2017). They will be a source of spreading Chinese knowledge and experience when they 
return. Based on perception of management of CI the scholarships are essential for enhancing 
the friendship relation with Egyptian publics. One interviewee stated that “[CI] We want that 
[Egyptian] students reflect the real China to Egypt when they are back” (Shi 2017). She 
continued with saying that when she had been studying in another Arabic country, she had 
been asked by people of that country whether she had TV at her home in China. She said that 
one reason for asking such a question was few communication channels with China which 
resulted in the lack of knowledge and information about China (Shi 2017).  
 
Against this backdrop, one reason for CI to grant a scholarship and enhance exchanges of 
students is that students can improve China’s image and reputation in mind of people. 
Fortunate students who have got a scholarship and which usually go to universities in big and 
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developed cities or those who study at CI are an amplifier for China as they distribute and 
share information about China. Each student is a mobile source of information which can 
share its experience and knowledge about China.  
 
7.1.7 Media  
Broadcasting  
Another element of public diplomacy is broadcasting and which is a vast means of 
communication. This activity can be found among things done by CI. Broadcasting of 
Chinese programs will enable China to reach a large part of Egyptian population with 
different class and backgrounds. Through broadcasting, CI can send different preferred 
messages about China to Egyptian people and which will mean a lot for China’s image.  
 
In this issue, CI is cooperating with an Egyptian TV channel to perform a Chinese cooking 
competition. By introducing Chinese food to Egyptian society, the latter familiarity with 
Chinese people and culture will increase too. According to one of the interviewee, “[Cooking 
food] is not only about preparing food, since its effect can reach beyond this simple 
aim...[L]earning how to cook Chinese food will make Egyptian people also ask about how 
Chinese people dress and even how Chinese people think” (Shi 2017). 
 
CI seeks to improve knowledge of people about China by any possible means. It plans to 
expand its broadcasting to foreign publics even more as it is negotiating with Nile TV channel 
to establish a ‘Confucius program’ to broadcast all its language and cultural activities (Shi 
2017; Amin 2016). Recently, a delegation from Hanban has visited Chairman of Nile TV 
group and discussed this issue with him.  
 
In fact, these programs will not only reach Egyptian society, as they can be received in all 
Arabic countries and be watched by all Arab populations. Concerning this fact, one can argue 
that China’s public diplomacy utilizes CI at SCU as a base to communicate and to engage 
with people of Arab countries in Africa and the Middle East. The reason for the need of 
reaching influence these people have been mentioned at the beginning of the discussion, as 
China has realized its necessity to improve its image and reputation, especially in Arab Oil-
rich countries. Also, as it will be discussed in the economy section, China needs to find new 
markets for its goods. Thus, broadcasting which is a cheap and efficient technique enables 
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China to fulfill this aim.  
 
China Radio International Film Festival  
China Radio International has held film festival called “Getting to know modern China-
Chinese film open day” at CI. In this festival, CI has helped China Radio International with 
facilities and other resources to present this festival (Hanban 2016). As the name of the 
festival discloses, the festival has aimed to introduce contemporary China to Egyptian people. 
During the festival, several Chinese films and Chinese Drama were screened and which all of 
them have had the same story as in Egyptian movies, as an attempt to send a message that 
Chinese society and Egyptian society are very similar. Also, the presented films could be 
watched by everyone as China Radio International has translated most of them into Arabic. 
The film festival has a been very active channel to send different messages to the audience, 
and it can enhance mutual understanding between Chinese and Egyptian people. Also, by 
screening translated films as requested by publics, CI seeks to send a message to the audience 
that it is listening to their demands and it is engaged with Egyptian society.  
 
Establishment of Newspaper  
As it has been mentioned in section 7.1.1, management of CI has succeeded to convince 
management of SCU to establish an Arabic section at Beijing Language and Culture 
University. Also, another outcome of cooperation between the two parts has been agreement 
on publishing a newspaper in both Arabic and Chinese. The newspaper will cover political, 
economic and cultural news from both China and Egypt and aim to introduce both countries 
to each other’s people (Canal Newspaper 2016; Atef 2016). Since the newspaper is one of 
biggest sources for gathering knowledge and news about the world, the news it provides 
perceived to be accredited. It will play a crucial role in shaping China’s global image and 
reputation by providing or abandoning certain information and data about China.  
 
7.2 Activities Promoting Economic Interests  
As it has claimed by Hanban CI is supposed to do only cultural and language activities. 
However, these activities in addition to other activities of CI seem to serve China’s national 
interests.  
 
There are several activities of CI which counts to be economic activities or at least support 
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economic interests of China. Indeed, another main reason behind the establishment of CI has 
been to serve economy of China as the geo-economic position of CI is vital in commercial 
accounts. Discussing cultural institutes in relations to economic issues, the first activity that 
might come to mind is an increase in tourism, selling of books or other cultural products. 
However, CI has served economy of China by cooperating and assisting with Chinese 
companies, seeking to improve China’s economic reputation, exporting Chinese technology 
and establishing the technological Institute.  
 
7.2.1 Geo-economic Factor: A Driving Force Behind Establishment of 
Confucius Institute  
By discussing why this CI has been set in this region, it becomes clear that one main reason 
has been to serve China’s economic interests. This fact has been confirmed by different 
sources as the same argument could be deducted from the answers. The interviewees have 
agreed that economic particularity and geo-economic position of this region has been the 
main reasons behind establishing CI at SCU in Suez region (Li 2017; Shi 2017; Tang 2017). 
The answers are not surprising since this area counts to be significant for China as it hosts a 
huge amount of investments and economic activities. Therefore, one of CI’s role has been to 
coordinate between different parts to facilitate the performance of Chinese firms in this 
region.  
 
One interviewee said that “This city [Ismailia] is vital for China as it is beside the Suez 
Canal” (Shi 2017). Another respondent stated that “The future of Egypt is here... It is the new 
Singapore. It is in the heart of Delta, and it is the capital of North while Cairo is the capital of 
South” (Tang 2017). According to one interviewee “China’s government has had precognition 
to decide to have a center for cultural radiation in this region” (Tang 2017). Egypt has granted 
China space to encourage Chinese firms to come and invest in this area to produce and export 
to entire Africa and other Arabic countries. In fact, China’s special economic zone is in Ain 
Sokhna port.  
 
In 2008, Chinese Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) Pacific, which is biggest Chinese 
shipping State Owned Company (SOC), has invested more than 185 million USD in building 
a container terminal in Port Said, northern Suez Canal (COSCO Pacific Announcement, 
December 11, 2008). Also, China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), which is another 
 49 
Chinese SOC, has invested 219 million USD in building dockside (CHEC Press Release, 
November 8, 2008). The Same company has already finished a project valued 1 billion USD 
in the same region (CHEC, 2009). China has continued to invest 416 million USD for 
construction of a cargo terminal at Adabiya port southern Suez Canal (Chinese Embassy in 
Egypt 2012).  
 
Consequently, one important issue which can reveal the operation of Chinese economic 
interests at CI is the geo-economic factor. In 2013, Hanban selected CI at SCU as the most 
important CI in the world because of its geo-economic position (Shi 2017; Li 2017; Tang 
2017). This factor has played a significant role in the establishment of CI in this region as this 
region is economically viable and surrounded by several ports. Port of Ain Sokhna southern 
Suez Canal and Port Said in the northern of Canal and which each of them is only 70km away 
from CI. Also, Damietta port is 140 km away from the Institute. These ports, which are shown 
on the map, are in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea and connect Asia with Europe and 
make an important part of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ plan.  
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This area, Suez region, is important for the economy of China because as China gradually 
incorporates into the world system, developing a maritime power become vital for its 
economic and political influence (Zheng and Xin 2017:17). Also, as China’s national 
development is primarily relying on maritime commerce, Suez Canal becomes significant as 
more than 8% of global trade goes by this Canal every year. Therefore, China has realized its 
need to increase its occurrence in this region by establishing CI to assist different Chinese 
companies to invest in this region and push the Chinese economy forward.  
 
7.2.2 Improvement of China’s Economic Reputation  
Another means of public diplomacy to assist economy of a country is by improving its 
economic reputation. In this respect, CI seeks to influence people’s perception regarding the 
economy of China by spreading information about its economic development. One way of 
doing this is through managing economic seminars for Chinese firms and businesspeople to 
meet Egyptian companies and people. In addition to other economic benefits which can be 
inherited, these workshops aim to send messages that economy of China is mature and has 
developed. The maturity of the Chinese economy is confirmed by the special economic zones 
in Africa and Egypt, and other economic activities in rest of Egypt. For Shi (2017) seminars 
show how China is proud of its high global economic position in the 21st Century (Shi 2017).  
 
Another way that CI aims to improve China’s economic reputation is by distributing 
economic information about China through the distribution of CIM. When I discussed the 
issue of distribution of CIM at CI with the management of CI, the conclusion has been that 
role of CI not only about culture and language. One of the interviewees said that: “Its [CI] 
role is a mixture of both educational and economic roles” ( Li 2017). This perception was 
shared by another interviewee who argued that “It is tough to separate culture from 
economic” (Shi 2017).  
 
Undoubtedly, distribution of information and knowledge about the economy of China aims to 
improve its economic reputation as a developed country in the mind of people. A good 
Chinese reputation would produce the supportive environment for China’s economic 
activities. These activities have some impacts on Egyptian society. One of the results is how 
CI has corrected students’ past reputation about China. For instance, some students have 
claimed that they did not know about China’s global economic position where some other 
 51 
mentioned China’s strong economy and its technological development.  
 
7.2.3 Economic Advocacy for the Chinese Companies  
In addition to economic reputation, public diplomacy advocates different parts of economy 
and trade of China. As an actor in China’s public diplomacy, CI has benefited economy and 
commerce of China by supporting China’s economic engines abroad, namely Chinese 
companies and investments.  
 
The evidence shows that CI has supported Chinese businesses in different ways. It has 
facilitated their access to Egyptian educated appropriate workers who speak Chinese and offer 
them Arabic classes to reduce the miscommunications with Egyptian. Also, CI has functioned 
as an employment office to meet Chinese in labor demands in addition to providing them 
consultation in different areas (Li 2017; Shi 2017).  
 
Xu Nanshan, Chinese General consular in Alexandria has stated that cultural communication 
and cooperation will be a springboard for political and economic cooperation between China 
and Egypt (Xu 2016 cited in Hanban 2016). When I inquired the management of CI whether 
CI does economic activities, I received different answers. Two of three interviewees 
confirmed that CI at SCU has relationships to China’s economic interests in this region (Li 
2017; Tang 2017). One of them clearly said that: “Yes ... For instance, CI does economic 
seminars to make Chinese firms familiar with the investment opportunities available in Egypt 
and to provide them with essential assists that every company needs” (Tang 2017).  
 
In contrast to the two interviewees, another interviewee (Shi 2017) stated that CI does not do 
any economic activity. However, her answer was contradictory as she said that “No there are 
not [Economic activities]... We [CI] organize only economic seminars” (Shi 2017). Then, I 
asked her whether economic seminars did not count to be economic activities, but she did not 
answer clearly and alleged that "We [CI] only help them [Chinese firms], we only provide the 
place" (Ibid). Last economic seminar has been in the previous year where Chinese companies 
have attended intensively. Undoubtedly, economic seminars are clear economic activities as 
they support Chinese companies directly by strengthening their foothold in Egypt. These 
seminars aim to make Chinese companies familiar with Egyptian market, as they are also a 
place for Chinese businesspeople to meet their Egyptian counterparts and a meeting point for 
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people of the two countries to meet each other.  
 
In addition to economic seminars, CI facilitates the necessity conditions for Chinese firms to 
grow in several ways. One way of helping Chinese companies is through helping a Chinese 
SOC called TEDA and which is one of the biggest Chinese company operating in this region. 
This company, which is a real estate developer, is responsible for marketing the Chinese 
special economic zone assigned by the Egyptian government to Chinese firms. The role of CI 
is that it cooperates with TEDA in its task in developing Chinese special economic zone. 
While Chinese TEDA is responsible for marketing the district to Chinese companies and 
which has attracted 68 Chinese enterprises until 2016 (TEDA), CI helps those companies to 
establish a company in Egypt by offering them courses in Egyptian investment law and other 
necessary information. Further, CI assists and provides consultation to Chinese enterprises in 
any interested area (Li 2017).  
 
Another economic support for is TEDA is by qualifying specialists in translation and 
interpreting in addition to establishing Chinese classrooms for TEDA in Ain Sokhna (Li 
2017; Shi 2017). Usually, Chinese firms employ Egyptian labor who cannot speak Chinese, 
then CI helps to solve this problem by teaching Egyptian labor Chinese language and culture 
(Shi 2017). Although, teaching the Chinese language is one of CI aim, the establishment of 
Chinese Classrooms in the Chinese economic zone are economic activities because these 
classes aim to fill the lack of human resources needed by Chinese firms since these companies 
rely on Egyptian labor force who cannot speak the Chinese language. Previously, 
miscommunication between Chinese bosses and Egyptian labor force has made the work for 
Chinese firms challenging (Li 2017; Shi 2017). Then, Chinese classrooms for Egyptian 
workers has solved some of the problems. Still, CI is asked by companies to translate the 
manuals of machines from Chinese to Arabic.  
 
Also, CI works as employment office for Chinese companies. In April 2017, CI and SCU 
together have held a recruitment conference for Chinese companies settled in Egypt. There 
have been 15 Chinese companies participated in the meeting where four of them are big 
companies, like Jushi Egypt which has invested 500 million USD, XD-EG MAC with 300 
million USD investment, FAM Sun and Hengshi (Confucius Ismailia 2017; Haraji 2017). In 
addition to 15 Chinese companies Economic and Commercial office of the Chinese embassy 
in Egypt has been presented. Frequently, Chinese companies need interpreter or translator. So, 
 53 
these companies call and ask CI for interpreter or translator, and in its turn, CI provide them 
to the appropriate employee. In the meanwhile, students leave their CV at the CI to be sent to 
the companies (Ibid).  
 
Li Zhenhua, the previous Chinese director of CI at SCU has met a delegation from Hanban in 
2016. During the meeting, Li Zhenhua has argued that CI attempts to increase its power 
through collaboration with Chinese companies settled in this region. Also, she has confirmed 
that CI seek to enlarge its internship program with local based Chinese companies to create 
more opportunities for students (Li Zhenhua 2016). In fact, when I talked to the students at 
CI, I found that the main reason for them attending CI is to get a job after graduation. This 
perception enhances China’s image and reputation as a global power which its development is 
helpful for others. This attitude is favored by Chinese as it confirms that China’s rise is 
peaceful and beneficial for other countries.  
 
7.2.4 Education as Support to Economy  
In 2017, a delegation from TEDA has visited CI to discuss orientations of studies. The main 
topic which has been considered by the two parts is the graduation of necessary human 
resources for Chinese firms (Shi 2017; Li 2017). In other words, this means that the 
educations courses provided at CI need to be adjusted in a way that can answer the needs of 
Chinese firms and graduated human resources should meet the demand of the market. Last 
year, there had been more than 700 students studying at CI where most of the courses have 
had business orientation.  
 
Also, as it has been mentioned earlier CI holds a CC for TEDA in Ain Sokhna to teach 
Egyptian workers Chinese language, and simultaneously it has established Arabic classrooms 
to teach Chinese staff Arabic.  
 
7.2.5 Transferring Chinese Science and Technology  
Another aim of public diplomacy is to make foreign public familiar with that country as much 
as possible. One significant way of reaching this objective is through transferring technology 
of that country to other nations. Indeed, transferring technology is principle number seven in 
 54 
China’s aid policy, and which has been followed by CI at SCU.9 CI has helped in transferring 
Chinese technologies in three ways by establishing: The China-Arab States Technology 
Transfer Centre, Beijing Institute of Technology and knowledge on Aquaculture (Fish 
Farming).  
 
Use of Chinese high technology by other countries is simply best propaganda that can serve 
economic and politics of China. As Chinese technology begins used by Egyptian people, 
people to people diplomacy between the two countries and people engagement with China 
would increase too. Also, transferring of technology means that China is a developed country 
where its people live a comfortable life and which reflect a concrete domestic reality of 
China. It would improve China’s image in the mind of Egyptian people and would enhance its 
global status.  
 
Transferring of technology to Egypt and other countries would increase these countries 
dependency and reliance on China and which consequently increase China’s economic power 
compared to other countries. Again, exporting Chinese technology will increase the demand 
for Chinese products. It will benefit Chinese firms in producing and exporting technological 
commodities to other nations, which also can enhance the position of Chinese currency in the 
global market. Besides, transferring Chinese technology to Egypt will support local Chinese 
companies and reduce supremacy of western companies over them.  
 
The China-Arab States Technology Transfer Centre  
One source of transferring Chinese technology has been China-Arab States Technology 
Transfer Centre (CASTTC).10 This center belongs to the China’s Ministry of Science and 
Technology and is part of larger Chinese project, which seeks to be the leading network for 
transferring technology and scientific cooperation between, on the one hand, China and on the 
other hand, Egypt and other Arab countries. This center aims to play a significant role in 
transferring high Chinese technology to Egypt, and at the same time, it works as a 
                                                      
9 In 1963, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai announced eight aid principles which later become known as 
Zhou Enlai’s principle. These principles stress the importance of self-reliance of receiving countries, 
non-interference of China’s foreign policy and non-conditionality of aid. 
 
10 It is worth mentioning that CASTTC has its office in Ningxia, which is an Islamic Chinese province. 
Also, by this act, China seeks to send a message to Arabic Muslim people that China has something in 
common with Egypt and other Arabic countries. Indeed, this is the primary task of public diplomacy 
in which China seeks to persuade Arabic publics that it is very close to them. 
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technological foundation for "One Belt and One Road" policy (Wang, J. 2015).  
 
CI has worked as a communication channel between CASTTC and Egypt, and it has paved 
the way for CASTTC to share Chinese technology with Egyptian people. CI has organized a 
visit for CASTTC to visit Egypt as CASTTC and an accompanying delegation was scheduled 
to visit CI in April this year. The delegation plans to include different Chinese agencies and 
actors like universities and companies, which aim to hold seminars, conferences, and 
exhibitions to present the latest Chinese high-technology to Egypt (Shi 2017). Furthermore, 
CI is helping CASTTC by reducing the obstacles such as providing the place and coordinating 
and inviting different Egyptian universities and companies to come to the planned fair. The 
main reason behind all this support is to marketing and promoting Chinese technologies (Shi 
2017; Li 2017) and which will have real economic and even political returns for China.  
 
Beijing Information Technology College  
Another source for movement of Chinese technology in Egypt and Africa is Beijing 
Information Technology College. Recently, SCU and Beijing Information Technology 
College have agreed upon establishing a new technological Institute at SCU where CI has 
designed and produced the agreement. This deal comes at a time when CI has been the link 
between the two parts and has been working to convergence their views and make them agree 
upon establishing this Institute. In November 2016, CI could manage that the two parts sign a 
protocol in which the new Institute would be inaugurated later this year. In April 2017, 
Beijing Information Technology College has visited SCU to activate and develop plans for 
study programs. Most of the Institute will be driven by Chinese experience and staff. This 
center aims to transfers Chinese high-technologies to rest of Africa and to other Arabic 
countries in the future (Li 2017).  
 
The main reason for establishing this Institute is to support economic activities in this region 
by seeking to provide the technological demands of this region in a best possible way. The 
most important thing is that this Institute will provide a technical degree in technology, which 
is unique in Egypt (Li 2017). This means that the Institute will graduate labor force who has 
a professional degree in technology. This type of labor force is essential for the development 
of this region considering different types of businesses operating in economic and industrial 
areas close to the ports, for instance, in Chinese economic zone.  
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Among the specialties that this Institute will work with is shipbuilding, fishery, heavy 
industries, mining, power generation, automation, manufacturing of industrial robot and other 
high technologies industries (Tang 2017). Interestingly, these specialties are related to 
Chinese firms investing in this region. For instance, as it has been mentioned in the previous 
section, COSCO and other Chinese companies investing in this region will need qualifications 
to operate and grow. Only this Institute aims to response to all development and technological 
demands that might rise in this region. In fact, instead of bringing all type of necessity human 
resources and equipment from China and which are both times consuming and expensive, this 
technological Institute will provide the necessary labor force and equipment to make the 
wheel of Chinese investment, and business revolves.  
 
Aquaculture  
Remaining in the world of technology, another technological activity of CI has been 
importing Chinese Aquaculture to this region by establishing an institute of fish breeding at 
SCU. This Institute has started a fish farming project at the university worth 5 million USD 
sponsored by the Chinese government and which later on has been used as a model by the 
Egyptian government for a similar project outside of university (Li 2017).  
 
The fish farming project has become the stepping stone and mentor for Egypt national fish 
farming project, which has been opened by the Egyptian president in 2014. The national 
project is 72 km long and will be implemented in phases besides the Suez Canal in El-Qantara 
50 km north of Ismailia where CI is located. Of course, using Chinese aquaculture technology 
as the module by a foreign country like Egypt for its national project means a lot for China’s 
technology reputation. Also, it means that China is a developed and belongs to techno logy-
exporting countries, which benefit their economy by exporting technology.  
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8. Conclusion  
Departing from critical realism ontology, this thesis has been able to find evidence that 
substantiates the proposed assumptions about CI at SCU. The thesis has shown that in the 
domain of real, there are mechanisms, namely Chinese political and economic interests, 
resulting in political and economic activities within the domain of actual. By analyzing 
activities of CI at SCU, it becomes apparent that the power mechanisms which operate at this 
Institute have shaped by China’s national interests. Even though CI is a center for teaching 
Chinese language and culture, but still its cultural and language activities in addition to other 
activities have been motivated by political and economic interests, and China’s public 
diplomacy has worked through this Institute. CI has been a producer and a nexus between 
Egypt and China, and it has sought to open different horizons for cooperation between on one 
hand Chinese universities and companies and on the other hand, their Egyptian counterparts.  
 
Nonetheless, it has been harder to substantiate the political assumption compared to the 
economic one. Among the evidence that substantiates political assumption are the influential 
role of CI. Management of CI has served China’s national interests by influencing the 
management of SCU in establishing different institutes. CI has functioned as an image 
brushing tool and maintained some political censorship. CI has started teaching Arabic 
lessons and provides the scholarship to students, aiming to make them cultural ambassadors 
for China. CI has sought to increase understanding of Egyptian people about China by 
distributing information through different sources, employing media. Also, it has intensified 
Chinese teaching sources, like language and cultural activities. In sum, an increase in the 
number of communication channels between China and Egypt means improving China’s 
image and support for China’s political interests. 
 
In contrast to political part, it has been easier to find evidence that supports the economic 
assumption. Apparently, CI has helped China’s economic interests in this region in various 
ways. Foremost, it has been confirmed by the management of CI that the main reason behind 
the establishment of CI at SCU has been the geo-economic factor. Furthermore, similar to 
political reputation, some of the activities attempted to improve China’s economic reputation. 
CI has supported Chinese companies in several ways, like providing special labor force and 
other necessary information about Egyptian market and investments’ law. CI has been a 
reason for exporting Chinese technology, which would serve economic of China in different 
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ways, like improving China’s economic reputation. CI has convinced SCU to cooperate with 
Beijing Institute of Technology to establish a new technological institute. In the same context, 
it has paved the way for China-Arab States Technology Transfer Centre to come to Egypt for 
transferring Chinese technology. These activities are to facilitate the development of Chinese 
firms in this region.  
 
A consideration is that China’s economic and political interests travel with its language and 
culture since it’s hard to separate them. However, this does not mean that this thesis aims to 
generalize its findings on other CIs since each CI has its cause and particularity. Despite my 
short stay in Egypt, I have been able to collect valuable information and evidence about 
activities of CI. However, it does not mean that I have reached all power mechanisms 
dominate the domain of real and some events might have gone unnoticeable.  
 
This thesis has resulted in exclusive findings of CI at SCU which can be a springboard for 
future researchers. Since Egyptian society is welcoming the role played by CI and look at it as 
a useful player, the future researchers can examine to what extent this CI has influenced the 
Egyptian society.  
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